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Signaling and mediation in games with common interests

Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah; Shmaya, Eran - In: Games and economic behavior 68 (2010) 2, pp. 670-682

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003976375

Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides

De Meyer, Bernard; Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah - In: Mathematics of operations research 35 (2010) 4, pp. 851-863

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008823133

Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah; Shmaya, Eran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 179-191

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738056

Duality and markovian strategies

Rosenberg, Dinah - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 27 (1998) 4, pp. 577-597

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001435300

"Cav u" and the dual game

De Meyer, Bernard - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000971106

Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001674650

Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001681867

On games of strategic experimentation

Rosenberg, Dinah; Salomon, Antoine; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 31-51

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239064

Strategic information exchange

Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 444-467

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243692

Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information

Cardaliaguet, Pierre; Rainer, Catherine; Rosenberg, Dinah; … - 2013

We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend, while the non-informed player only observes his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010394152