We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegationframework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself andmust choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. Inthe focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating...

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent...

For binary-action supermodular games with a continuum of symmetric players, we show that simple global game information structures can be used to implement an optimal outcome under adversarial equilibrium selection

We study a strict version of the notion of equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (1997) that allows for a larger class of incomplete information perturbations of a given complete information game, where with high probability, players believe that their payoffs are close to (but may be...