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Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah; Shmaya, Eran - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 179-191

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738056

A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games

Chen, Yi-Chun - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 587-597

We prove that the structure theorem for rationalizability originally from Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) applies to any finite extensive-form game with perfect recall and suitably rich payoffs. We demonstrate that the ties induced by the extensive form do not change the result of Weinstein and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049820

On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games

Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (2011) 6, pp. 683-688

This note demonstrates that a symmetric 3×3 supermodular game may fail to have any equilibrium robust to incomplete information. Since the global game solution in symmetric 3×3 supermodular games is known to be independent of the noise structure, this result implies that a noise-independent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065398

Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

Nora, Vladyslav; Uno, Hiroshi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 150 (2014) C, pp. 866-877

We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743795

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Morris, Stephen; Ui, Takashi - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets … behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of … existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762463

Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring

Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195601

Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Lehrer, Ehud; Rosenberg, Dinah; Shmaya, Eran - In: Games and economic behavior 81 (2013), pp. 179-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358096

Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

Nora, Vladyslav; Uno, Hiroshi - In: Journal of economic theory 150 (2014), pp. 866-877

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360437

Robust control, informational frictions, and international consumption correlations

Luo, Yulei; Nie, Jun; Young, Eric R. - In: European economic review : EER 67 (2014), pp. 1-27

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423039

Uncertainty in the traveler's dilemma

Bavly, Gilad - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 46 (2017) 1, pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946852