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Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to … within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are randomly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967

Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values

Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003985854

Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying

Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333

Strategies under strategic uncertainty

Mass, Helene - 2018

I investigate the decision problem of a player in a game of incomplete information who faces uncertainty about the other players' strategies. I propose a new decision criterion which works in two steps. First, I assume common knowledge of rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

Strategic disclosure of demand information by duopolists : theory and experiment

Jansen, Jos; Pollak, Andreas - 2015

We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301237

Duopoly Competition, Escape Dynamics and Non-Cooperative Collusion

Janjgava, Batlome - 2012

In this paper, we study an imperfect monitoring model of duopoly under similar settings as in Green and Porter (1984 … cooperative motives. In contrast to Green and Porter (1984), our results show that in a model with learning, breakdown of a cartel …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113984

Contests with sequential entry and incomplete information

Deng, Shanglyu; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 705-742

This paper provides a general study of a contest modeled as a multiplayer incomplete-information, all-pay auction with sequential entry. The contest consists of multiple periods. Players arrive and exert efforts sequentially to compete for a prize. They observe the efforts made by their earlier...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576711

The Private Value Single Item Bisection Auction

Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Grigorieva, Elena; Muller, … - 2003

In this paper we present a new iterative acution, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. We will show that the bisection auction is computationally more efficient than the classical English auction while it still preserves all characteristics the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014095794

On the existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; MacLean, Richard P. - 2015

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397925

Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games

Han, Seungjin - 2021

This paper proposes a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. This paper introduces a notion of robust equilibrium. If each agent’s payoff function is separable with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226689