In this paper, we investigate whether Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), with readily pledgable Government assets, reduce the underinvestment problems faced by private sector firms in emerging markets. We analyse investment-cash flow sensitivity and its determinants for the partnering private...

In this paper, we investigate whether Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), with readily pledgable Government assets, reduce the underinvestment problems faced by private sector firms in emerging markets. We analyse investment-cash flow sensitivity and its determinants for the partnering private...

We present an asymmetric information model to examine private placements issued to owner-managers. Our main conclusion is that allowing private placements to insiders can mitigate, if not eliminate, the underinvestment problem. Our model predicts that announcement period returns for private...

We present an asymmetric information model to examine private placements issued to owner-managers. Our main conclusion is that allowing private placements to insiders can mitigate, if not eliminate, the underinvestment problem. Our model predicts that announcement period returns for private...

We present an extension of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model to examine private placements issued to owner-managers. Our main conclusion is that allowing private placements to insiders can mitigate, if not eliminate, the underinvestment problem. Our model predicts that announcement period...

This paper's aim is two-fold. First, to investigate whether regulatory intervention, to improve insider trading transparency, leads to higher information production. Second, to understand how market imperfections can distort uniform impact expected out of regulatory intervention. We use Indian...

We investigate whether busy boards add more value to standalone firms compared to business group affiliated firms in India – an economy plagued with significant institutional voids. Using board composition data of the top 500 Indian firms spanning the period 2003 to 2006, we find that firm...