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This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. Forward guidance and the credibility of the central bank are uniquely modeled by utilizing a game-theoretic evolutionary framework. We estimate credibility for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012844416
This paper examines the effectiveness of forward guidance in an estimated New Keynesian model with imperfect central bank credibility. Forward guidance and the credibility of the central bank are uniquely modeled by utilizing a game-theoretic evolutionary framework. We estimate credibility for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846480
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012127586
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433756
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247540