In This Paper, We Show That, in Debt Contract Relationships, the Choice of a Lender May Become a Determinant of the Extent of Competition in Downstream Industries. in the Presence of Imperfect Output Markets and Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets Members of an Industry May Achieve a...

We Present a Model of an Entry Game in Which Both Financial and Output Markets Are Characterized by the Presence of Asymmetric Information. We Argue That a Firm's Financial Policy May Serve As a Common Signal in Both Markets. a Monopoly Is Threatened by Entry. the Profitability of Entry to the...

This Paper Provides a Formal Representation of Telser (1966)'S Deep Pocket Argument. According to Telser, Predation May Take Place Because Typical Entrants Are More Vulnerable Financially Than Are Typical Incubents. We Propose That Entrants' Financial Vulnerability May Be Explained by...

I Suggest in This Paper Both to Drop the Terms "Bureaucracy", "Bureaucratic Conduct" As Analytical Concepts, and to Avoid Writing Models Upon Models Around These Words, Models That Are Not Anchored in Facts. Instead, the Suggestion Made Is to Concentrate on the Facts and Try to Explain Why We...

This Article Investigates the Practice of Experience Rating by Insurance Companies in the Presence of Symmetric Information Between the Insured and the Insurer. Experience Rating Is Treated As the Acquisition of Information by Both Parties to the Insurance Contract. When the Insured Buys...