We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career...

We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the...

Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable theta and have to decide how much effort to devote to collect private information and consequently how much to rely on public information. The latter is just a noisy average of past predictions. It is shown that costly information acquisition...

This paper puts forth a simple model explaining the manner in which news aggregators such as Google News or Yahoo! News build herd behavior through information cascades. The model suggests that (1) an increase in the number of Internet users will make herding more significant over the Internet,...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

We analyze in this study cause of herding in a stock market. Information cascades have often been considered as a primary choice. However, we propose alternative explanations in this study. Employing intraday order book data, we suggest including an alternative theory based on search cost of...

A sender who wants to influence a decision maker has no incentive to collect information if he has to reveal all evidence so obtained, because the expected value of posterior belief is equal to the prior. If he can conceal his evidence at a cost, he invests more in obtaining information when...

A data buyer faces a decision problem under uncertainty. He can augment his initial private information with supplemental data from a data seller. His willingness to pay for supplemental data is determined by the quality of his initial private information. The data seller optimally offers a menu...

We explore model misspecification in an observational learning framework. Individuals learn from private and public signals and the actions of others. An agent's type specifies her model of the world. Misspecified types have incorrect beliefs about the signal distribution, how other agents draw...

This paper studies a principal-agent model where a risk-neutral principal delegates to a risk-neutral agent the decision of whether to pursue a risky project or a safe one. The return from the risky project is unknown and the agent can acquire costly unobservable information about it before...