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On information aggregation and interim efficiency in networks

Jiménez-Martínez, Antonio - In: Games 8 (2017) 1, pp. 1-14

This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their … neighbors in the network. I derive a closed expression for the (interim) social welfare loss that depends on the initial … information structure and on the possible pieces of information that can be gathered under the network. Then, I explore how …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011621465

(Presentation Slides) Taking the Road Less Traveled by : Does Conversation Eradicate Pernicious Cascades?

Cao, H. Henry - 2018

We offer a model in which sequences of individuals often converge upon poor decisions and are prone to fads, despite communication of the payoff outcomes from past choices. This reflects both direct and indirect action-based information externalities. In contrast with previous cascades...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012914362

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Attention manipulation and information overload

Persson, Petra - 2013

When a decision-maker's attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker's attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222954

Strategic inattention in product search

Hillenbrand, Adrian; Hippel, Svenja - 2017

Online platforms provide search tools that help consumers to get betterfitting product offers. But this technology makes consumer search behavior also easily traceable for the platform and allows for real-time price discrimination. Consumers face a trade-off: Search intensely and receive better...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737481

Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly

Ganuza, Juan José; Jansen, Jos - 2010

By using general information structures and precision criteria based on the dispersion of conditional expectations, we study how oligopolists’ information acquisition decisions may change the effects of information sharing on the consumer surplus. Sharing information about individual cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014191014

Updating Awareness and Information Aggregation

Galanis, Spyros - 2020

The ability of markets to aggregate information through prices is examined in a dynamic environment with unawareness. We find that if all traders are able to minimally update their awareness when they observe a price that is counterfactual to their private information, they will eventually reach...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850568

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately … their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic … dominate farsighted equilibria, in particular if a social planner has designed the network optimally. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule of the mechanism. Thus, in contrast to the standard analysis of a optimal auctions, the seller can explicitly design the disclosure of the information received by each bidder as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079579

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

We propose a sequential auction mechanism for a single object in which the seller jointly determines the allocation and the disclosure policy. A sequential disclosure rule is shown to implement an ascending price auction in which each losing bidder learns his true valuation, but the winning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013045254