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Every new method of trade offers an opportunity for economic agents to compare its costs and benefits relative to the status quo. Such comparison motivates sorting across market segments and reshapes the whole marketplace. The Internet provides an excellent example: it introduces substantial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054233
Every new method of trade offers an opportunity for economic agents to compare its costs and benefits relative to the status quo. Such comparison motivates sorting across market segments and reshapes the whole marketplace. The Internet provides an excellent example: it introduces substantial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057048
We examine the effects of informational intermediation by a third party 'infomediary' in a search model with heterogeneous seller qualities and asymmetric information. The infomediary earns revenue by selling a list of accredited sellers (a 'guidebook') to buyers and selling accreditations to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057918
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619
We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053483
Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198969
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774
characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648090
An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the state of a project prior to investing in it. For a given level of investment, a good project succeeds with higher probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012117630
We model a competitive labor market with heterogeneous firms of varying productivities, and consider two information-collection processes: searching for "good news" about applicants, and searching for "bad news." Under the former, firms seek positive signals to qualify applicants, and under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061024