Prior research suggests that: (1) politically active firms have an information advantage over firms that do not engage in the political process, but also that (2) politically active firms are more likely to disclose policy-related information. We examine whether there are externalities...

We examine how the co-location of firms in the same industry affects analysts' cost of gathering and processing information. We find that when the firms in an analyst's portfolio are located farther away from other firms in the same industry, the analyst's portfolio size is smaller and average...

Research documents price comovements or “spillovers” between focal firms and peer firms at focal-firm-earnings announcements. We find signed and absolute comovements between focal-firm and peer-firm returns are significantly lower at earnings-announcement dates compared to non-announcement...

We study whether accounting information quality (AIQ) is priced in the executive labor market. Focusing on externally hired CEO compensation at their initial appointment, we find a 7.38% pay premium for a one-standard deviation decline in AIQ measured in the years preceding the appointment. This...

Using the introduction of high-speed rail (HSR) as an exogenous shock to costs of information acquisition, we show that reductions in information-acquisition costs lead to (i) a significant increase in information production, evidenced by a higher frequency of analysts visiting portfolio firms,...

Using the introduction of high-speed rail as exogenous shocks to costs of information acquisition, we show that reductions in information-acquisition costs lead to a significant increase in information production and improvement in output quality, evidenced by higher frequency of analysts...