Suppose that agents share risks in competitive markets. We show that better information makes everyone worse off if the economy has a representative agent-that is, the economy's demand for state contingent consumption equals the demand of a hypothetical agent who owns all the economy's wealth....

Both consumers and a monopolist producer are uncertain about a good's quality. I derive conditions under which the value of public information about quality will be positive or negative to consumers and the firm. I find that the firm always prefers more information, but consumers may not. I...

This paper revisits the well-known result of Radner and Stiglitz (1984) which shows that, under certain conditions, the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range. Their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realizations are finite,...

This paper revisits the well-known result of Radner and Stiglitz (1984) which shows that, under certain conditions, the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range. Their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realization are finite,...