We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...

This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their actions to the true value of some uncertain (exogenous) parameter and to the actions of the other agents. Each agent begins with some initial information about the parameter and,...

We implement multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory. While full-information transmission is not theoretically feasible in the standard one-sender-one- dimension model, in this setting with more senders and dimensions, full revelation is generically a robust equilibrium outcome. Our...

This study experimentally analyses traders' choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. While asymmetric information has been necessary to explain a bubble in past theoretical models, our experiments show that traders have an incentive to hold a bubble...

Asymmetric information has been necessary to explain a bubble in past theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders' choices, with and without asymmetric information, based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders have an incentive to hold a bubble asset for longer,...

This paper investigates how college students update their future earnings beliefs using a unique 'information' experiment: We provide college students true information about the population distribution of earnings, and observe how this information causes them to update their future earnings...

This paper investigates how college students update their future earnings beliefs using a unique 'information' experiment: We provide college students true information about the population distribution of earnings, and observe how this information causes them to update their future earnings...

Consider an investment problem with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about returns. This paper shows that investors aggregate their private information in equilibrium by trading a token and observing its market price over multiple rounds before making the investment...