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Damme, Eric E. C. van - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285514

Makrēs, Miltiadēs; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1475-1509

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440070

Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games

Milchtaich, Igal - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 2, pp. 283-350

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359437

Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium

Maniadis, Zacharias - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 4, pp. 991-1008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485713

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011500622

Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium

Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Cerreia-Vioglio, S.; Maccheroni, … - In: Journal of mathematical economics 66 (2016), pp. 40-51

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665877

Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell

Amir, Rabah; Belkov, Sergei; Evstigneev, Igor V. - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011669288

Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell

Amir, Rabah; Belkov, Sergei; Evstigneev, Igor V. - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 83 (2017) 4, pp. 457-468

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781800

Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium

Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; … - 2016 - This version: May, 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011814425

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672033