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I study whether self-fulfilling bank runs can occur when banks use sophisticated contracts and withdrawal decisions are public information. In a finite-agent version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with correlated types, I first present an example in which a bank run perfect Bayesian equilibrium...
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In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
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Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents' behaviour...
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We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in a committee with members of both common and conflicting interests. We show that the set of preferences that allow for the existence of an informative voting equilibrium can be heavily restricted by the presence of a...
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