We study the Bayesian implementation problem in economies that are divided into groups consisting of two or more individuals with the same information. Our results cover problems like that of allocating public funds among states, regulating activities causing externalities among firms, locating...

This paper studies an allocation problem in which a welfare-maximizing planner needs to allocate two objects to two agents who are initially uninformed of their valuations of the objects. The planner controls both the in- formation accessible to the agents and the process by which it is...

This paper considers a model in which an activist or terrorist uses violence to signal commitment to a political agenda. We examine how this violent signaling may be countered and reduced by the use of information-gathering mechanisms. Signaling through violent activism does not necessarily...

There often exists a supermajority rule that enables the minority party to delay or prevent a vote on a bill. I construct a two-period model consisting of a representative voter, self-interested parties, and a media outlet. In the model, the majority party has an incentive to misrepresent the...

This paper explores the incentives of product designers to complexify products, and the resulting implications for overall product quality. In our model, a consumer can accept or reject a product proposed by a designer, who can affect the quality and the complexity of the product. While the...

When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...

The benefits’ valuation of a public good is a complex procedure. Many benefits are external benefits. In other cases the perceived benefits are contingent on the individual condition or they will be perceived in a future time. A complete valuation needs a lot of information about the public...

When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...

We draw together concepts from political science, law, and economics to model discretionary actions by agents in a weak hierarchical system, wherein agents at a higher level cannot directly discipline those at a lower level. In particular, we model the decision by an appeals court judge to...

Seminal papers on the size of the firm emphasise the benefits of in-sourcing over outsourcing services from the market. This provides a rationale for the development of large firms, especially in circumstances of market risk and uncertainty as to the price and quantity of available services....