In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent. Behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the surplus. The frequency of behavioral types is determined...

This paper analyzes a decentralized search and matching economy comprised of heterogeneous agents. The paper looks at a model with additive search costs and transferable utility, gives a general proof of equilibrium existence and shows that perfect assortative matching is the unique equilibrium...

This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a...

In this paper, I analyze a decentralized search and matching economy with transferable utility comprised of heterogeneous agents. I explore whether Becker's assortative matching result generalizes to an economy where agents engage in costly search. In an economy with explicit additive search...