We investigate the impact of information sharing between rivals in a dynamic auction with asymmetric information. Firms bid in sequential auctions to obtain inputs. Their inventory of inputs, determined by the results of past auctions, are privately known state variables that determine bidding...

We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product but must hire employees to bring the product to the market. However, newly hired employees learn the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We develop a bargaining model that...

We address the problem faced by innovators who have an idea for a marketable product butmust hire employees to bring the product to the market. Information leakage implies that newly hired employees become informed of the idea and may attempt to bring the product to the market themselves. We...

The focus of this paper is the endogenous formation of peer groups. In our model, agents choose peers before making contributions to public projects, and they differ in how much they value one project relative to another. Thus, the groups preference composition affects the type of contributions...