We show that lenders join a U.S. commercial credit bureau when information asymmetries between incumbents and entrants create an adverse selection problem that hinders market entry. Lenders also delay joining when information asymmetries protect them from competition in existing markets,...

We use the introduction of a U.S. commercial credit bureau to study when lenders adopt voluntary information sharing technology and the resulting consequences for competition and credit access. Our results suggest that lenders trade off access to new markets against heightened competition for...

We examine how developments in financial technology that improve information sharing affect lender specialization. Using the introduction of a U.S. commercial credit bureau, we document that lenders leverage their collateral expertise to enter new markets after joining. We exploit the staggered...

We use the introduction of a U.S. commercial credit bureau to study when lenders adopt voluntary information sharing technology and the consequences of this sharing technology for competition and credit access. Our results suggest that lenders trade off access to new markets against heightened...

I examine how credit reporting affects where firms access credit and how lenders contract with them. I use within firm-time and lender-time tests that exploit lenders joining a credit bureau and sharing information in a staggered pattern. I find information sharing reduces relationship-switching...