We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to disclose information to the governments in the...

We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms’ incentive to disclose information to the governments in the...

We examine the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information. Assuming instead that firms have better information, we explore the long-term incentives for firms to consistently disclose information to their governments in the standard...

Large firms often negotiate wage rates with labor unions. When they do so, an ex-ante agreement to share information about parameters should make it more likely that they will be able to reach an agreement and capture the gains from trade. However, if the firm refuses to share information, the...