In this paper, we study how the terms of access to an incumbent’s infrastructure (i.e., the level of access and price) affect an entrant’s incentives to build its own infrastructure. Setting a high level of access (e.g., a resale arrangement), which requires relatively small up-front...

In this paper we study an entrant's incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent's infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step into...

In this paper we study an entrant’s incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step...

We analyse competition between vertically-integrated operators who build infrastructure and provide access in different geographical areas. Under full commitment, the regulator sets socially-optimal access rates that depend on the local degree of infrastructure competition. If he can only commit...

We introduce a model of asymmetric competition where two network operators with different investment costs may build an internet access infrastructure and where a virtual operator provides services through third-party access. We show that the virtual operator requests access from the low cost...

In this paper we study how a phase of service-based competition during which a new entrant operator leases access to an incumbent operator's network affects the entrant's incentives to build an alternative infrastructure. In line with the "stepping stone" and "ladder of investment" arguments, we...