We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and heterogeneous southernfirms that compete in a final product market. We assume southern firms differ in their intrinsiccosts and their ability to adapt technology and study southern incentives to protect intellectualproperty rights. We find...

Our context involves Cournot oligopolists producing NM products at constant marginal costs when preferences are quasi-linear. We identify relationships between second moments of unit costs and second moments of firm-level production. For example, a larger variance in unit costs of a product...

We develop a model with one innovating northern firm and several heterogeneousSouthern firms that compete in a final product market. We assume the southern firms differ intheir ability to adapt technology and use this heterogeneity to study the differing incentives ofsouthern governments to...

A partial-equilibrium, two-country model is developed to analyze implications from the introduction of genetically modified (GM) products. In the model, innovators hold proprietary rights, farmers are (competitive) adopters, some consumers deem GM food to be inferior in quality to traditional...