We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces e.ort and profits under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to leave for a rival. This alleviates a commitment...

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution <p> to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces e.ort and profits <p> under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to <p> leave for a rival. This alleviates a...</p></p></p>

We study the mapping between labor mobility and industrial innovative activity for thepopulation of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004. Our studydocuments a positive relationship between the number of workers who join a firm and thefirm’s innovative activity. This...

We study the mapping between labor mobility and industrial innovative activity for the population of R&D active Danish firms observed between 1999 and 2004. Our study documents a positive relationship between the number of workers who join a firm and the firm's innovative activity. This...

We investigate the effect of mobility of R&D workers on the total patenting activity of their employers. Our study documents how mobile workers affect the patenting activity of the firm they join and the firm they leave. The effect of labor mobility is strongest if workers join from...

R&D incentives of new entrants to a market may be shaped by the prospects of being acquired by an incumbent. In this paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage, firms compete to develop innovations of high quality. They...