Empty creditors — bondholders hedged with Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) — face incentives to holdout from “Distressed Exchanges” (DEs) of debt because the CDS hedge alters their payoffs to favor bankruptcy. We show using detailed data on DEs that firms respond to this holdout problem by...

This paper provides evidence that firm value declines when credit default swaps (CDS) are initiated, and that the effect is greater when CDS trading activity is higher. This decline, which arises from an increase in the cost of capital as opposed to a decrease in free cash flows, traces to a...

Credit default swaps (CDS) introduce frictions in debt renegotiations because they alter the incentives of creditors insured with CDS to favor bankruptcy instead of restructuring debt out-of-court. Such renegotiation frictions can increase bond spreads by increasing distress resolution costs....

Over the last decade, the availability of credit default swaps (CDS) has dramatically transformed the markets for credit insurance by providing participants efficient avenues through which to share credit risks. These risk-sharing benefits notwithstanding, the growth of credit default swaps...

Many borrowers make extra principal payments on their mortgages (curtailers). Some of these curtailers subsequently go through foreclosure and lose any benefits from their curtailments. Such curtailers reveal ex-ante non-strategic preferences towards default. We contrast the default sensitivity...