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In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012210861
. Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative … the nonemptiness of the core of project games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070682
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250500
.Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a correspondingcooperative … nonemptiness of the core of project games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379216
.Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a correspondingcooperative … nonemptiness of the core of project games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325893
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a … particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional … stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326439
We offer a new approach to the well-known bankruptcy problem based on Kaminski's idea. With the help of hydraulic rationing we give a proof to Aumann and Maschlers theorem i.e. the consistent solution of a bankruptcy problem is the nucleolus of the corresponding game. We use a system of vessels...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494472
We offer a new approach to the well-known bankruptcy problem based on Kaminski's idea. With the help of hydraulic rationing we give a proof to Aumann and Maschlers theorem i.e. the consistent solution of a bankruptcy problem is the nucleolus of the corresponding game. We use a system of vessels...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009152568
games. Liability games are superadditive, constant sum, partially convex, and partially concave. The core of a liability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010994
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a … particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional … stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066642