Showing 1 - 10 of 61
We study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions, with a special focus on institutional “flexibility.” A government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society. The competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities (e.g.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205726
We study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions, with a special focus on institutional "flexibility". A government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society. The competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities (e.g., by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013151384
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009309123
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875831
In this essay, we provide a simple conceptual framework to elucidate the forces that lead to institutional persistence and change. Our framework is based on a dynamic game between different groups, who care both about current policies and institutions and future policies, which are themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481156
We study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions, with a special focus on institutional "flexibility". A government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society. The competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities (e.g., by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463419
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012304364
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012304891
In this essay, we provide a simple conceptual framework to elucidate the forces that lead to institutional persistence and change. Our framework is based on a dynamic game between different groups, who care both about current policies and institutions and future policies, which are themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823238
In this essay, we provide a simple conceptual framework to elucidate the forces that lead to institutional persistence and change. Our framework is based on a dynamic game between different groups, who care both about current policies and institutions and future policies, which are themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013403531