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It has been well-documented that Disability Insurance (DI) may cause moral hazard in terms of higher disability risk and lower employment. For supplementary insurance from private insurers, however, the effects are less well understood: extra coverage may further increase workers' moral hazard,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077129
Disability Insurance (DI) may affect workers' outcomes such as their probability to enter DI, to recover, and their employment. Supplementary insurance may increase these moral hazard effects, but also increases the financial gains of private insurers to reduce benefit costs. With increased...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014030828
Supplementary private Disability Insurance (DI) may increase workers' moral hazard, but also the incentive for private insurers to reduce benefit payments with prevention and reintegration activities. With unique administrative data on firm insurance contracts, this paper separates such worker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014344998
This paper analyzes selection and incentive effects of opting out from public to private insurance on employer Disability Insurance (DI) inflow rates. We use administrative information on DI benefit costs and opting-out decisions of a balanced panel of about 140,000 employers that are observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295552
This paper analyzes selection and incentive effects of opting out from public to private insurance on employer Disability Insurance (DI) inflow rates. We use administrative information on DI benefit costs and opting-out decisions of a balanced panel of about 140,000 employers that are observed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295708
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information about the true disability status of applicants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012006211
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011911559
We examine the targeting effects of increased scrutiny in the screening of Disability Insurance (DI) applications using exogenous variation in screening induced by a policy reform. The reform raised DI application costs and revealed more information about the true disability status of applicants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012026029