This article reports on the proceedings of ECRI's 10th Annual Conference on Healthcare Policy, Law, and Methodology, held October 29-30, 2002, in Plymouth Meeting, PA. The conference discussion focused on how evidence reviews based on the relatively new science of research synthesis will play an...

This Issue Brief presents the findings of a study of what employers think and do about providing health benefits for their own workers and what they think about covering the population without health benefits. Most Americans under age 65 received health coverage through employers. Yet, about 16...

We study age-rating restrictions in the health insurance marketplaces introduced by the Affordable Care Act. Because most buyers are subsidized, although age-rating restrictions affect pre-subsidy premiums, participation is primarily driven by subsidy generosity rather than pricing decisions....

This statistical note compares insurance coverage rates and poor health status rates for self-employed working-age individuals to non-self-employed working-age individuals. Results are presented for two different age categories holding marital status constant

In the USA, previous to the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, about 50 million people under 65 years didnt́ have any (private or public) health insurance. A lot of them have been temporally insured via an employer sponsored group insurance. Because of the linkage to the job, group...

This paper studies the design of health insurance with ex post moral hazard, when there is imperfect competition in the market for the medical product. Various scenarios, such as monopoly pricing, price negotiation or horizontal differentiation are considered. The insurance contract specifies...

This paper studies the design of health insurance with ex post moral hazard, when there is imperfect competition in the market for the medical product. Various scenarios, such as monopoly pricing, price negotiation or horizontal differentiation are considered. The insurance contract specifies...

This paper studies the design of health insurance with ex post moral hazard, when there is imperfect competition in the market for the medical product. Various scenarios, such as monopoly pricing, price negotiation or horizontal differentiation are considered. The insurance contract specifies...

This paper studies the design of health insurance with ex post moral hazard, when there is imperfect competition in the market for the medical product. Various scenarios, such as monopoly pricing, price negotiation or horizontal differentiation are considered. The insurance contract specifies...