When considering contributions to electoral campaigns in the U.S., the data reveals that total contributions within industries tend to vary signifcantly over time. To explain this evidence, we present a model in which interest groups finance politicians that require funding for campaign...

When considering contributions to electoral campaigns in the U.S., the data reveals that total contributions within industries tend to vary signifi?cantly over time. To explain this evidence, we present a model in which interest groups fi?nance politicians that require funding for campaign...

In electoral competitions, interest groups will be willing to finance politicians that require funding for campaign advertising, in exchange for policy favors. Our model predicts that interest groups with more extreme preferences will devote more resources to campaign financing. This occurs...

When considering contributions to electoral campaigns in the U.S., a puzzling regularity is that some industries tend to spend significantly more than others. To explain this evidence, we present a simple theoretical model in which interest groups finance politicians that require funding for...