Is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments? Based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post-electoral period. However,...

Is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments? Based on the political cycles theory we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post-electoral period. However,...

Do countries interact when they decide whether or not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol? If so, what is the nature of these interactions? To answer these questions, we provide a theoretical analysis based on the notions of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity. Firstly, we analyze...

Do countries interact when they decide whether or not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol? If so, what is the nature of these interactions? To answer these questions, we provide a theoretical analysis based on the notions of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity. Firstly, we analyze...