This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...

Based on unique data from a world-wide survey of agents involved in international climate policy, this paper empirically analyzes the importance of equity in this field. We find that equity issues are considered highly important in international climate negotiations and that the polluter-pays...

Klimaschutz stellt aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie ein rein öffentliches Gut dar. Internationale Kooperation zum Zweck der Milderung oder Verhinderung der globalen Erwärmung ist daher mit den bekannten fatalen Anreizproblemen behaftet: Auf der Basis freiwilliger, dezentraler Entscheidungen...

This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large...