Why do some people think they will behave differently in the future? Building on research on dynamic inconsistency and age related preferences, this paper introduces the concept that inconsistent intertemporal preferences are directly related to age. In previous studies, standard socioeconomic...

Since Thaler (1981), we have lived with the uncomfortable stylized fact that many humans choose strictly dominated actions in intertemporal choice experiments. We designed an experiment to probe the reasons for the apparently suboptimal behavior, and we find that the classic Fisher (1930)...

Households' and firms' subjective inflation expectations play a central role in macroeconomic and intertemporal microeconomic models. We discuss how subjective inflation expectations are measured, the patterns they display, their determinants, and how they shape households' and firms' economic...

Hyperbolic discounting (H) is currently the dominant behavioral model of intertemporal choice, since it better explains how people behave than the normatively correct exponential discounting model (E). This paper promotes an arithmetic discounting model (A) which challenges H. First, A is more...

This article casts doubt on the conclusion reached by experimentalists in behavioral economics (and other subjects such as social psychology and political science) that hyperbolic discounting explains their data better than exponential discounting. A dual expression to the exponential...

The recent literature has emphasized that government intervention when consumers have quasi-hyperbolic preferences ('bias for the present') over consumption is not welfare-enhancing. This paper introduces a market imperfection (which takes the form of a negative externality) and shows that...

In the last twenty years a growing body of experimental evidence has posed a challenge to the standard Exponential Discounting Model of choice over time. Attention has focused on some specific 'anomalies', notably preference reversal and declining discount rates, leading to the formulation of...

When solving discrete-time consumption models with present-biased time preferences, backwards induction generates equilibria that are non-robust in the sense that policy functions are often sensitive to parameter choices, including the modeler's choice of the time-step. The current paper...

Time-inconsistent, present-biased agents may hold commitment assets hoping to keep their current and future present bias in check. Paternalistic governments, in an effort to help such people, routinely offer commitment machinery such as restrictions (or bans) on early withdrawals from...