We study the effects of the investment horizon on asset price volatility using a Learning to Forecast experiment. We end that, for short investment horizons, participants coordinate on self-fulfilling trend extrapolating predictions. Price deviations are then reinforced and amplified, possibly...

In economic environments, decision-makers can strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others. This creates free-riding incentives and can lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. We experimentally examine if and how communication mitigates this free-riding problem...

Breach penalties can be used to protect specific investments and are therefore a remedy against holdup. Not all breach remedies are, however, equally efficient. Some common types are predicted to protect too well thereby inducing overinvestment. Theoretically overinvestment is driven by two...

Breach remedies serve an important role in protecting relationship-specific investments. The theoretical literature predicts that some commonly used types of breach remedies may protect too well, in the sense that they induce over-investment. The driving forces behind this result are the...

In economic environments, decision-makers may strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others creating socially suboptimal outcomes. We investigate if and how communication mitigates the strategic delay in investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a...