This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives' own firm...

We model and empirically assess industry tournament incentives for CEOs. The measures we develop for the tournament prize derive from the compensation gap between the CEO at her firm and the highest-paid CEO among similar competing firms. The model predicts that firm performance and risk...

Traditional finance theory suggests that riskier investments should yield higher returns. Challenging this notion, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that highly-incented managers may take on excessive risk, leading to greater losses, while other theoretical research argues that high...

We evaluate the link between CEO industry tournament incentives (ITI) and the product market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITI increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITI strengthen the relation between excess cash and market share gains especially...

In this paper, I examine whether longer duration of executive compensation influences investment decisions. I exploit a regulation designed to foster long-term orientation in executive compensation as an exogenous trigger to lengthen executives' incentive duration. I find that treated firms...

We investigate the effect of CEO inside debt (i.e. pension benefits and deferred compensation) on firms' asset tangibility and investment. Asset tangibility is measured by Property, Plant and Equipment, Asset Tangibility (Berger, Ofek and Swary, 1996), and tangible assets. Our findings are...

Nepotism emerges in a multiplicity of contexts from political assignments to firm hiring decisions, but what are its real effects on the economy? This paper explores how nepotism affects corporate investment. To measure nepotism, we build a unique dataset of family connections among individuals...

Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large...

Improvements in investment efficiency and increase in volume of investments are parts of investment activity, and the growth of it is a necessary condition for economic development in every country. In environment of external mechanisms weakness for favorable investment climate creation, the use...

Are firms' financial disclosure decisions affected by executive compensation at other firms? We find that a CEO's pay gap relative to the highest CEO pay among industry peers, defined as industry tournament incentives, can lead to distortions in corporate financial disclosures. Our analyses show...