This paper analyzes the incentives that network operators have to invest in facilities with different levels of quality. We extend the framework of Armstrong-Laffont-Rey-Tirole by introducing an investment stage, prior to price competition, and we study the dynamic aspects of two-way access...

In September 2016, the European Commission (EC) published its proposal for a directive establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) – with one key aim being the provision of sufficient incentives for infrastructure investments into high-speed communication networks. Based on...

In this paper we study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy (copper) and fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in network infrastructure. To this end, we develop a theoretical model explaining investment incentives by incumbent telecom operators and heterogeneous...

We investigate cooperative investment in a new infrastructure and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment only increases total coverage if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high....

Investments in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this...