The optimal contracts in portfolio delegation under general preferences are characterized when the underlying state variable is not contractible, and the principal must rely on the final returns of portfolios to design the compensation schemes for the fund manager. We show that the optimal...

We exploit the staggered introduction of the PCAOB’s international inspection program to examine the role that the stringency of public audit oversight plays in shaping US institutional investors’ home bias. Analyzing a sample of foreign firms listed in the United States, we evaluate whether...

We exploit the staggered introduction of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) international inspection program to examine the role that exogenous shocks to the stringency of public audit oversight plays in shaping U.S. institutional investors' home bias. Analyzing a sample of...

This paper studies the conflict between ESG funds and their investors. Funds trade-off greater short-term financial performance against long-term sustainability. This conflict results in ESG funds voting against their stated pro-social mandate, even when supported by proxy advisors. Lower...

This is the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Mutual funds tend to vote for dissident nominees at firms with weak operating and financial performance, and when dissidents are hedge funds. Notably, passive funds are more likely to support incumbent management than...

There are two major institutional investors in the syndicated loan market: collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and bank loan mutual funds. CLOs are closed-end funds while bank loan mutual funds are open-end funds that issue claims that are redeemable on demand. In this paper, we examine...