We study the loosening of restrictions on the use of leverage, derivatives, and illiquid assets by mutual funds. In contrast to previous studies, we find that the allowance of these complex instruments is associated with poor performance and higher risk. The underperformance is most acute during...

We study fund-firm connections that arise when firm executives and directors serve as fund directors. We find that connected funds are significantly more likely to vote with management in proposals with negative ISS recommendations or low shareholder support. As our data shows that management...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

This paper examines the influence corporate executives sitting on mutual fund boards exert on the investment decisions of the fund. Our results show that funds bias their holdings toward the executive's firm. Furthermore, we find that these funds trade informatively in the executive's firm, in...

This study examines boardroom connections that form when corporate executives sit on mutual fund boards. These connections have the potential to facilitate information flow that informs fund investment decisions. I find that fund trades in the executive’s firm anticipate future earnings news...

This paper examines managerial response to widespread selling by mutual funds. We study the effect on share repurchases of liquidity-based price pressure, measured by mutual fund transactions caused by capital outflows. Firms whose shares undergo widespread selling by funds experiencing large...