In this paper, we investigate whether fund-specific risk helps explain performance persistence in private equity funds, using detailed deal-level cash flow information at both the fund and deal levels. We further extend existing findings to international evidence on buyout and venture capital...

Compensation of funds managers increasingly involves elements of profit sharing that entitle managers to option-like payoffs. An important example is the compensation of private equity fund managers. Compensation of private equity fund managers typically consists of a fixed management fee and a...

Compensation of private equity fund managers typically consists of a fixed management fee and a performance related carried interest which entitles managers to option-like payoffs. We consider whether this structure tends to reward excessive risk-taking rather than managerial skill. Our model of...

This paper extends the standard Merton portfolio choice model to include illiquid private equity funds. This is done in a realistic modeling framework where private equity funds cannot be traded during their entire bounded lifecycle and involve capital commitments and intermediate capital...