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We show that equilibrium matching models imply that standard estimates of the matching function elasticities are exposed to an endogeneity bias, which arises from the search behavior of agents on either side of the market. We offer an estimation method which, under certain assumptions, is immune...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122974
We show that equilibrium matching models imply that standard estimates of the matching function elasticities are exposed to an endogeneity bias, which arises from the search behavior of agents on either side of the market. We offer an estimation method which, under certain assumptions, is immune...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009309463
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009259684
We conduct a joint dynamic analysis of individual labor market and mental health outcomes. We allow for a two-way interaction between work and mental health. We model selection in and out of employment as well as between jobs on a labor market with search frictions, where we account for the...
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We propose a highly tractable way of analyzing business cycles in an environment with random job search both off- and and on-the-job (OJS). Ex post heterogeneity in productivity across jobs generates a job ladder. Firms Bertrand-compete for employed workers, as in the Sequential Auctions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012909968
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, thus sparing their incumbent employer the firing costs. Furthermore, employers can induce their unprofitable workers to accept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119296
Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, thus sparing their incumbent employer the firing costs. Furthermore, employers can induce their unprofitable workers to accept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009488421