We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooted in workers’ advance information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible...

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...

Do more people choose to become self-employed when search frictions decline? The origin story of the gig economy suggests that improvements in communication technologies increase the self-employment rate, while cross-country evidence suggests the opposite. We reconcile conventional wisdom with...