We investigate how borrowers' corporate governance influences bank loan contracting terms in emerging markets and how this relation varies across countries with different country-level governance. We find that borrowers with stronger corporate governance obtain favorable contracting terms with...

This paper investigates the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance-pricing provisions) are more favorable and syndicated loans...

Motivated by recent studies that show female CFOs are more risk averse than male CFOs when making various corporate decisions, we examine whether banks take into consideration the gender of CFOs when pricing bank loans. We find that in our sample, firms under the control of female CFOs on...

We investigate the impact of going-concern opinions on price and non-price terms of bank loans. We argue that the existence of going-concern opinions increases both the default risk ex post and the information risk ex ante. Therefore, upon the issuance of these opinions, banks impose more...

Motivated by recent studies showing that female CFOs are more risk-averse than male CFOs when making various corporate decisions, we examine whether banks take into consideration the gender of CFOs when pricing bank loans. We find that in our sample, firms under the control of female CFOs on...