This study investigates how debt maturity structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. The empirical evidence reveals an inverse relation between the strength of shareholder rights and debt maturity. We contend that managers of firms with weak shareholder rights eschew choosing...

We examine how executive pension and deferred compensation plans affect bank risk-taking. We show that banks with more inside debt incentives are 5-8% less likely to approve risky mortgages. Using state individual tax rates as instruments, we show that the effect is likely to be causal. Further...

There are two main sources of confusion in the public corporate governance debate. One is the confusion about the role of public policy intervention. The other is a lack of empirical knowledge about the corporate landscape where rules are supposed to be implemented and the functioning of...

The paper investigates the influence of firm-level corporate governance on the capital structure pattern of non-financial listed firms using Bangladesh's case study. The agency theory suggests that better corporate governance will reduce agency costs and improve investors' confidence, which in...

One of the most important discussions in economic research is about how to provide the right incentives to individuals. Usually when a regulator defines a rule, it has to deal with some tradeoff. This paper proposes to study a specific trade-off that emerges with the possibility of reversal of...

In contrast to the US experience, most international (European) REITs are subject to prudential regulation. This paper investigates the effects on capital structure and, consequently, on REITs' share value of the major legal and market constraints (i.e. leverage limitations, market discount on...

A dual-class ownership structure, accompanied by disproportional control rights, is traditionally considered to be an inferior form of governance. We examine how the capital structure choices made by dual-class firms (i.e., by their controlling shareholders or insiders), as well as the...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...

This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on executive incentive schemes. We argue that excessive risk-taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...