In the period following WW II. until the country accessed the European Union, cartels were legalized in Austria, upon registration with the Austrian Cartel Court. We obtained access to the registration data, and scanned them all towards a microeconomic analysis of contracting behavior between...

Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country’s EU Accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different...

In the period following WW II until the country accessed the European Union, cartels were legalized in Austria, upon registration with the Austrian Cartel Court. We obtained access to the registration data, and scanned them all towards a microeconomic analysis of contracting behavior between...

This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...

We conduct an experimental study of cartel behaviour in the presence of an active competition authority that may respond to suspicious pricing behaviour by firms. We find that subjects are doing very well in developing strategies to avoid antitrust detection. We observe gradual price increases...

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the...

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust...