The Strategic Framework for Development and Climate Change (SFDCC) approved in 2008 guides and supports the operational response of the World Bank Group (WBG) to new development challenges posed by climate change. One activity pursued by the SFDCC is to further develop and test methods to...

Greenhouse gas abatement is a public good, so climate policy is a public-goods game and suffers from the free-rider incentives that make the outcome of such games notoriously uncooperative. Adopting an international agreement can change the nature of the game, reducing or exacerbating the...

Developing countries reject meaningful emission targets (recent intensity caps are no exception), while many industrialized countries insist that developing countries accept them. This impasse has prevented the Kyoto Protocol from establishing a global price for greenhouse gas emissions. This...

Climate negotiations have largely failed, so a change of course is required. This requires that a sizable group of experts recommend a small, clear set of policy guideposts that lead to a more cooperative treaty. This papers proposes a set of three guideposts and derives them from an analysis of...

The Kyoto summit initiated an international game of cap and trade. Unlike a national policy, the essence of this game is the self-selection of national emission targets. This differs from the standard global public-goods game because targets are met in the context of a global carbon market. This...