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The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications

Einy, Ezra; Moreno, Diego; Shitovitz, Benyamin - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 28 (1999) 1, pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001434479

Convex games and stable sets

Einy, Ezra - In: Games and economic behavior 16 (1996) 2, pp. 192-201

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001211884

Private value allocations in large economies with differential information

Einy, Ezra; Shitovitz, Benyamin - In: Games and economic behavior 34 (2001) 2, pp. 287-311

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001556698

Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games

Einy, Ezra; Holzman, Ron; Monderer, Dov; Shitovitz, Benyamin - In: Journal of economic theory 76 (1997) 1, pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001227564

Situation approach to cooperation

Greenberg, Joseph - In: Cooperation : game-theoretic approaches ; [proceedings …, (pp. 143-166). 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001321229

Stable coalition structures with unidimensional set of alternatives

Greenberg, Joseph; Weber, Shlomo - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000818108

The number of blocking coalitions when relative size is restricted

Greenberg, Joseph; Weber, Shlomo; Yamazaki, Akira - 1980

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000165271

On blocking coalitions : linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind

Greenberg, Joseph (contributor); Weber, Shlomo (contributor) - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002530588

On blocking coalitions : linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind

Greenberg, Joseph; Weber, Shlomo; Yamazaki, Akira - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002390665

Chapter 37 Coalition structures

Greenberg, Joseph - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1305-1337). 1994

The study of stable coalition structures, or more generally of coalition formation, was conducted mainly within the framework of games in coalitional form. The most commonly used stability concept is the coalition-structure core, which extends individual stability to group stability. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024437