We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from...

We examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the marginal per capita return (MPCR), i.e. the return to each participant from...

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of the individual-punishment mechanism in larger groups, comparing groups of four to groups of 40 participants. We find that the individual punishment mechanism is remarkably robust when the MPCR is held constant despite the coordination problems...

Using a dictator game, we examine the other-regarding behavior of allocators who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making an allocation decision without consultation on behalf of a two-person group between their group and another group. We then contrast the behavior of the same...

This paper presents evidence that trust and reciprocity behavior and perceptions is sensitive to whether people are making decisions solely on their own behalf or when they are given the responsibility to act on behalf of their groups. Employing the widely-used experimental framework of the...