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By combining the approaches of Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Bernanke et al. (1999), I develop a DSGE model with leverage constraints both in the banking and in the non-financial firm sector. I calibrate this "full model" to US data. In a world with only a monetary policy and a productivity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238505
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I add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009664958
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The global economy will be slightly more dynamic during the forecast period. In particular, the emerging market economies will grow a bit faster as a result of higher export demand. The recovery in the United States will gain in strength, supported above all by private consumption expenditure....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010460672
The paper adds a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke, Gertler and Girlchrist (1999, BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506744
We examine, conditional on structural shocks, the macroeconomic performance of different countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) rules in small open economy estimated medium scale DSGE. We find that rules based on the credit gap create a trade-off between the stabilization of fluctuations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921203
I add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099227
The paper adds a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke, Gertler and Girlchrist (1999, BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108089
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009539787