We show that mortgage recourse systems, by discouraging default, magnify the impact of nominal rigidities and cause deeper and more persistent recessions. This mechanism can account for up to 40% of the recovery gap during the Great Recession between the U.S. (mostly a non-recourse economy) and...

I show that both before and after the Great Recession, housing dynamics strongly correlate with current account dynamics, both across and within countries. In a benchmark DSGE model of housing markets, housing price-to-rent ratios are counterfactual if the transmission channel from housing to...

This paper proposes a tractable way to incorporate lending standards ("credit qualification thresholds") into macro models of financial frictions. Banks can reject borrowers whose risk is above an endogenous threshold at which no lending rate sufficiently compensates banks for the borrowers’...

We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank-capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected...

We study how investors in housing markets have changed after the 2009 financial crisis and the consequences for the markets and the economy. We document several new facts: (a) Institutional investors have replaced individual investors. (b) Most new investors are buy-and-hold investors as they...