We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are generally...

How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest...

Economic interactions often take place in open communities, in which agents are free to leave a community to join a more preferred one. Tiebout (1956) conjectured that “voting with feet” might generate considerable efficiency gains since individuals with different preferences sort themselves...

How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest...