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The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition...
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A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...
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In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a 'dualize and restrict' procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272559
We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-game and a cooperative solution. For such models, Shenoy's (1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We present three different versions of his condition in...
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